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Abstract—Modern corporations physically separate their 
sensitive computational infrastructure from public or other 
accessible networks in order to prevent cyber-attacks. However, 
attackers still manage to infect these networks, either by means of 
an insider or by infiltrating the supply chain. Therefore, an 
attacker’s main challenge is to determine a way to command and 
control the compromised hosts that are isolated from an accessible 
network (e.g., the Internet). 
In this paper, we propose a new adversarial model that shows 
how an air gapped network can receive communications over a 
covert thermal channel. Concretely, we show how attackers may 
use a compromised air-conditioning system (connected to the 
internet) to send commands to infected hosts within an air-gapped 
network. Since thermal communication protocols are a rather 
unexplored domain, we propose a novel line-encoding and 
protocol suitable for this type of channel. Moreover, we provide 
experimental results to demonstrate the covert channel's 
feasibility, and to calculate the channel’s bandwidth. Lastly, we 
offer a forensic analysis and propose various ways this channel can 
be detected and prevented. 
We believe that this study details a previously unseen vector of 
attack that security experts should be aware of. 
  
Index Terms— Air gapped networks, APT, command & control, 
covert channels, thermal communication. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HERE is a common defense strategy in which an air gap 
(some physical gap) is placed between networks that 
maintain sensitive systems and all other nonessential 
infrastructures which are connected to a public network. The 
thinking behind this strategy is: if there are no connections 
between the sensitive network and all other public networks 
(e.g. the internet) then the sensitive network is secure from 
remote attacks. In other words, the belief is that attackers cannot 
breach an air gapped network if they have no physical way of 
communicating with it. However, this strategy is not foolproof. 
As a result, attackers have been developing methods for 
"bridging the air gap," and in several cases they have been 
successful [1–3]. 
A well-known attack in which an air gap was bridged 
occurred when the computer virus "Stuxnet" targeted the 
Iranian nuclear program [4]. This virus was able to intrude an 
isolated computer network that operated delicate centrifuges. 
Another example is the "agent.btz" [5], a malware which was 
used against US military networks. According to publications it 
caused no damage, however, it was the first confirmed case of 
the infection of a secure US government network which was 
 
 
separated by an air gap. 
A. Advanced Persistent Threats    
In many cases, it is highly beneficial for an attacker to be 
able to send commands to malware it has successfully planted 
in an air gapped network. In order to understand why, it is 
important to understand what advanced attack looks like. 
Advanced attacks, also known as Advanced Persistent Threats 
(APTs) [6–8], are attacks that involve a process of several 
stages before arriving at their ultimate goal. These attacks are 
"Advanced" in terms of their technological awareness, 
"Persistent" in their well-supported campaign to achieve the 
final goal, and considered to be "Threats" to the intended victim 
as the attackers have both capability and intent. The goal of the 
APT depends on what the attacker desires to achieve. Many 
APTs, such as those that occurred to RSA [9] and various 
diplomatic agencies [10], have the goal of data exfiltration (data 
theft), while some, such as "Stuxnet", have the goal of causing 
damage to assets within the target network.  
In Fig. 1, the stages of an APT are illustrated. In the first 
stage, the attacker researches the target network in order to 
understand how to gain access to it, and to perform the attack. 
During this stage the attacker typically researches the network’s 
equipment, as well as researches the target organization’s 
employees. Knowledge on the employees is important in order 
to perform stage 2, since the initial intrusion into the network is 
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Fig. 1.  The stages of an APT on a victim’s network. Typically, stages 2-5 are 
controlled by the attacker from a remote location over a public network such 
as the internet. 
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typically accomplished via a social networking attack. An 
example of a social engineering attack is where the attacker 
sends an email with an infected attachment, and the attachment 
is opened by the unsuspecting victim, thereby stealthily 
infecting the victim’s computer with the attacker’s malware. 
Another example of a social engineering attack is where the 
attacker creates an infected USB thumb drive that loads the 
attacker’s malware into any computer to which the drive is 
plugged into. The attacker then gets the unsuspecting victim to 
plug the drive into their computer by curiously placing the drive 
in various locations near the victim (such as on the floor). 
In stage 2, at least one computer in the target network has 
been infected with the attacker’s malware. At which point stage 
3 begins where the malware searches the infected host 
(computer in a network) for ways to gain access to higher 
privileged resources and data (that can be access through 
various exploitations in the host’s system’s code). Once 
sufficient control has been acquired over the host, stage 3 
begins where the malware begins spreading across the network 
to strengthen its foothold on the network, and acquire access to 
the attacker’s target asset within the network (in most cases the 
initial intrusion is not topologically near the attack’s target 
asset. A target asset can be a server, subsystem, database… etc. 
depending on the goal of the attack. 
Once the asset has been reached, or at a determined time, the 
attack is performed and typically all evidence of the APT is self-
removed by the infected hosts from the network. 
The stages in Fig. 1 are placed in a cycle, since in some cases 
the attacker can perform multiple sequential attacks, each 
different than the last. In which case, the attacker may need to 
perform stages 1-4 again, although these stages will be different 
that the last attack (perhaps shorter of non-existent). 
The steps of an APT attack become challenging for the 
attacker when the targeted network is isolated by an air gap. 
After stage 2, the attacker can no longer control the activities of 
the malware that now runs inside the target network. This 
generally results in an autonomous attack like in the case of 
Stuxnet. In order to be more effective, the attacker would 
benefit from the ability to command and steer the APT attack 
throughout the process. For example, in the case where the 
attacker's goal is data exfiltration, the attacker may change the 
target file types or content that should be found and collected 
for exfiltration. In the case where the attacker's goal is a cyber-
attack, (i.e. goal is to destroying/modify some asset(s) in the 
compromised network) the attacker may want to control the 
exact time when the destruction/modification process should 
begin. 
To conclude, an APT involves an advanced attacker who is 
extremely motivated, and would benefit from a command and 
control channel to the compromised hosts within the target 
network [7]. 
B. Exploitation of Local Networks 
In some cases, an insecure / publically connected network 
overlaps the same physical space as an air gapped network. 
These networks can easily be overlooked by security experts 
and then later compromised as a stage in attacking the nearby 
secure network. 
One example of such an insecure and seemingly innocent 
network and asset is the heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) system that is connected to an accessible 
network or even to the Internet. Today, many large buildings’ 
HVAC systems are connected together by a network in order to 
report failures and to provide controls of their activity (such as 
setting the temperature in every room) [11].  
With the boom of the Internet-of-Things, these types of 
infrastructures are being connected to publically accessible 
networks [12].  
While there are different vendor specific TCP/IP connected 
centralized air conditioning systems [13], a specific example of 
a network-based building management system which handles 
HVAC is BACnet (building automation and control networks) 
[14]. BACnet is an ANSI and ISO standard communications 
protocol used to communicate with control systems for 
applications such as heating, lighting and fire detection. A 
BACnet network can be connected to the internet for remote 
management or as a means for connecting several BACnet 
systems together [11], [15]. A BACnet internet gateway can be 
compromised to give an attacker control over a building’s 
HVAC system. 
An example of a similar system being compromised 
occurred in 2013 when two researchers hacked into a Google 
office building's HVAC system with little difficulty [16]. The 
compromised system (Tridium Niagara AX platform) not only 
gave the researchers access to the heating and cooling of 
targeted rooms, but it also gave them access to floor plans and 
possibly bridged LAN hosts (computers in the local network). 
Similar vulnerabilities have been seen in this system, giving 
attackers access to building locks, electricity, elevators, and 
various other automated systems of the building [17]. At the 
time of writing this paper (2015), there are currently 36,287 
Niagara web portals that can be found using the Shodan 
computer search engine [18], 27,657 of which are in the U.S. 
alone. This is an increase of 15,743 exposed systems since 
2012, and only 269 of the systems are protected with HTTPS 
[19].  
Lastly, another possibility for compromising an HVAC 
system (specifically the air conditioning section) is to attack a 
Wi-Fi-enabled thermostat [20]. Many of these types of 
interfaces are susceptible to Wi-Fi or other social engineering 
attacks [21]. 
C. Bridging and Air Gap using Thermal Signals 
In this study, we propose a new adversarial model that 
enables a remote attacker to send commands to infected hosts 
over an air gap: The attacker compromises an HVAC network 
located on the same premises as the infected hosts, and then 
uses the air conditioning system to send thermal signals to them. 
The thermal signals are picked up by the infected hosts' internal 
thermal sensors. This model essentially establishes a one 
directional covert broadcast channel to infected hosts within an 
air gapped network. Such a broadcast system could be used to 
manage APT remotely, or for some other attack such as 
initiating a denial of service (DoS) attack performed in order to 
interfere with daily work [22]. 
Studies on the formation of covert channels based on 
temperature effects have been conducted before. For instance, 
in [23] and [24] the authors show how a covert channel can be 
created based on clock skewage from imposed CPU loads. 
However, this type of channel is not possible over an air gap 
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due to the lack of a wired interconnectivity. Moreover, in [25] 
the authors mention how two air gapped servers in a stack could 
possibly transfer bits to one another by heating up the 
environment around them. However, no details or concrete 
experimental results were provided.  
A recent work of ours [26] we showed how two computers 
can communicate with each other using thermal signals by 
heating up their environment by imposing heavy computational 
loads. In contrast, our work provides a channel capable of 
significantly higher bit rates (40 vs 7.5 bits/sec), and proposes 
a new vector of attack that does not require the incidental 
placement of two PCs next to each other (one on an air gapped 
network, the other not). 
Therefore, the contributions of this paper are as follows: 
1) A new adversarial attack model for bridging an air gap. 
We propose a new adversarial attack model which can be 
used to send commands to infected hosts within an air 
gapped network. We discuss the steps required by the 
attacker to establish this attack, as well as the forensic 
evidence which results from using this model. We also 
propose methods for detecting this attack model, and steps 
that can be taken to prevent it.  Moreover, we provide a high 
level protocol that could be used to manage the proposed 
attack. Awareness of this example protocol may assist 
security experts in revealing covert thermal channels.  
2) A thermal environment line-encoding. We propose a 
line-encoding (baseband modulation) which can be used to 
create a narrow-band communication channel over an open 
air environment. The proposed channel is used to measure 
the feasibility of the attack model as a signaling channel. 
We provide experimental results to demonstrate the 
channel’s usage in the attack model, and discuss the secrecy 
of the proposed protocol and line-encoding. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, a 
motivating attack scenario is proposed. In Section 3, the 
channel with its theory and line-encoding is detailed. In Section 
4, a thermal transmission protocol is proposed, along with a 
more advanced management protocol. In Section 5, 
experimental results are presented. In Section 6, Forensics and 
Countermeasures are discussed, and in Section 7, a conclusion 
with prospects for future work is provided. 
II. ATTACK SCENARIO 
In this section we detail plausible attack scenario, in which the 
proposed adversarial model may be used to an attacker’s 
advantage. 
A. The Motivating Scenario   
Let us assume that the target organization uses a contained 
Ethernet environment, physically disconnected from the 
Internet and every other public network. However, in parallel to 
the organization's network, the encompassing building has a 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system 
whose control center has a connection to some other public 
network such as the Internet (see Fig. 2). 
In this scenario, the attacker wishes to perform an APT on 
this organization, and plants malware on random hosts within 
the network. The attacker infects some of hosts behind the air 
gap using one of numerous social engineering attacks. For 
instance, by means of an infected USB device plugged in by an 
insider [27]. USB infection is a common way to make an initial 
infection to an air-gapped network and to spread malware to 
new hosts. This is the technique that was used by Stuxnet, 
Flame and Gauss [28]. Furthermore, attacks on the supply-
chain can be used to implant the malware on the hosts like the 
case of the NSA secretly planting backdoors on routers shipped 
abroad [29]. It is reasonable to assume that other air-gapped 
networks have been bridged with similar tactics, although they 
have not been publically reported. 
The attacker in this scenario needs the flexibility of steering 
the attack by activating the actions in Table I when needed. For 
instance, the attacker may want to search for and edit a file in 
the network several years later (other examples can be found in 
Table I).  In order to accomplish this, the attacker needs the 
ability to covertly broadcast commands to the infected hosts 
behind the air gap. Therefore, the attacker plans this ahead 
accordingly, and uses the adversarial attack model propose in 
this paper. 
B. The Proposed Adversarial Attack Model 
The overview of the proposed adversarial attack model can 
be seen in the use-case (Fig. 2) and is performed as follows. 
Step 1: The attacker’s commands are sent to a command & 
control server somewhere in the internet. This is done to add a 
degree of separation between the attacker and the attack thereby 
protecting the attacker’s identity [7]. Steps 2-3: The server 
forwards the commands to the infected HVAC system’s central 
management unit via the system’s internet web interface (there 
for legitimate remote control over the HVAC system [13], [17]). 
Steps 4-5: The HVAC system transmits the commands over the 
air by altering the thermal environment according to a 
predetermined protocol.  
This attack model conforms to an APT attack in the 
following way. During the reconnaissance stage of the APT 
(stage 1 in Fig. 1), the attacker determines what type of HVAC 
system or building management protocol the organization is 
 
Fig. 2.  The use-case of the proposed adversarial attack model. The compromised hosts within an isolated network receive commands from the 
attacker over the air gap (literally and figuratively). 
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using and maps out its network.  
Once control over the HVAC system has been established 
(link 3 in Fig. 2), the attacker develops a malware client 
designed to receive and interpret thermal signals from the 
environment (sent from the local air conditioner).  
This client-side receiver is not difficult to make since many 
personal computers today include a thermal sensor. The 
computer’s BIOS collect these readings and present them to the 
operating system. For instance, the Win32_TemperatureProbe 
class from Window's WMI Provider gives live temperature 
readings of the host's CPU. Once the malware has control over 
the host, these sensors can be exploited to sense changes of 
temperature from the environment (discussed later in more 
detail). A command interpreted from the thermal signals will 
cause the malware to perform a pre-coded task based on the 
received parameters (such as those from Table I). 
Once the malware is ready, the attacker performs stage 2 the 
APT from Fig. 1 by infecting some of the hosts in the target 
network using one the methods mentioned in Subsection 2.1. 
Lastly, APT stages 3 and 4 are performed autonomously as the 
malware spreads across the network gaining access to various 
assets.  
At this point, the attacker has a unidirectional broadcast 
channel to the infected hosts to command them when needed 
(links 4 and 5 in Fig. 2). Although the attacker does not know 
which hosts within the building have been successfully 
infected, the attacker has control over the building’s HVAC 
system and can perform an effective broadcast to all locations. 
Since the malware propagated autonomously, the probability of 
successfully making contact is increased. Moreover, the 
attacker has the option to design the malware clients to keep a 
low signature communication network among themselves. 
Doing so will help strengthen the foothold on the network by 
enabling the propagation of newly received commands to hosts 
that are not affected by the changes in the temperature.  
Now the Attacker has all the needed tools to perform various 
attacks at stage 5 of the APT in Fig. 1 with flexibility in timing. 
In order to avoid suspicion, the attacker will broadcast of the 
commands (i.e., the changing of the rooms’ temperature) at 
night when no personnel are present. 
III. THE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
One way of transmitting information is to use the air itself. 
Essentially, communication is the act of propagating signals 
across a physical media over some distance. If an air 
conditioner (the transmitter) emits heat signals from a 
publically networked source to a thermal sensor of a computer 
(the receiver), then the attacker has affectively bridged the air 
gap.  
The subject of channel line-encodings (the method of which 
binary is represented and propagated over a physical medium) 
has not been researched in depth for thermal channels. The 
commonly used line-encoding schemes are designed for 
specific kinds of physical media [30]. Voltage and electro-
optical-based line-encodings are not suitable for transmitting 
binary data thermally across open environments because of the 
slow turnaround time from hot to cold. For example, the classic 
return to zero (RZ) encoding technique and all encodings from 
the same family require a full transition from one level to 
another to represent a bit. Modulation schemes such as phase-
shift keying (PSK), frequency-shift keying (FSK), and 
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) all depend on a 
carrier wave, making them problematic for the same reason. 
In this section we propose a new thermal line-encoding, 
suitable for such environments, which can be used in the 
proposed adversarial attack model. Although the data-rate is 
low (with respect to modern communication channels) it is 
more than enough for the attacker’s needs according to the 
attack scenario (further details on the data-rate can be found in 
Section 5). 
Lastly, although we outline a thermal channel line-encoding, 
there are many different variations that can achieve the same 
goal. This section should serve as a guide for security experts 
in helping them know what to look for and what is possible with 
such an attack. 
A. Covert Thermal Line-Encoding 
The most important characteristic of the proposed channel is 
its covert capabilities [31]. In other words, the secrecy of the 
channel is more important than its capacity for transferring bits. 
Although the attacker from this scenario (Section 2) will only 
transmit bits during the night, it is still a good idea to maintain 
a low profile. There are many ways to achieve this; we will offer 
one method to demonstrate its plausibility. 
In our encoding scheme, we assume that it is impossible for 
the temperature to be the same or to change at the same rate for 
all areas within the environment. We believe this to be a 
reasonable assumption since the actual room's temperature will 
vary depending on the proximity of the thermal sensor 
(receiver) to the source of the air conditioning unit. 
The proposed encoding forms a non-linear time invariant 
TABLE I 
EXAMPLES OF OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS THAT MAY BE PERFORMED ON A 
TARGET NETWORK 
Task Description 
Search and delete 
a file 
The removal of sensitive files for the advantage 
of some cause. For instance, military intelligence 
documents or digital evidence that support a 
certain case. This can be done by searching for 
keywords. 
Search and edit a 
file 
The changing of files or data entries found by a 
key-word similarity search. For instance, 
replacing names of people or locations or other 
string swaps that violate a file’s integrity. 
Temporarily 
disable a system 
asset 
Disabling a host, server or subsystem by means 
of an internal DoS attack or the direct 
intervention of some infected host. 
Temporarily 
disable a security 
protocol 
Disabling the security measures of a host, 
subsystem or even a security authentication 
waypoint for personnel.  
Move collected 
data to a staging 
area 
In the case where sensitive information has been 
gathered by the infected hosts, the data can be 
copied to a common extraction point. For 
instance, an insider whose presence within the 
isolated network is only temporary. 
Self-Destruct 
Covering tracks. All evidence of the infection 
and log files that may indicate the existence of 
the APT are deleted. 
Encryption key 
change 
The changing of the encryption key is used in the 
communication between infected hosts or their 
encrypted log files. 
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(NTI) system that is similar to the RZ line coding scheme. 
Similarly to RZ, the observable signal (temperature) 
fluctuations are minimal. In other words, in RZ, if there is a 
series of ones or zeroes—then the signal remains unchanged. 
As mentioned earlier, this imposes a problem in 
synchronization since a long stream of the same bits can cause 
timeslots to slip. This is why the proposed protocol (addressed 
later) limits the frame length, and includes a short 
synchronization preamble.  
Let the proposed simplex channel be 𝐶 and its transmitter 
and receiver be 𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively. Let 𝑇 be the length of the 
timeslot and equivalently the transmission time of a single bit. 
Let 𝐻 and 𝐿 be the maximum and minimum target 
transmissions temperatures of the encoding in Celsius, and let 
𝐷 = |𝐻 − 𝐿| be their difference. Let 𝑂 be the significant 
difference in temperature in Celsius which is observable by an 
unaware human subject over the interval 𝑇. Although the attack 
scenario from Section 2 takes place at night and assumes that 
there are no personnel present, we include the notion of 𝑂 to 
help extend the channel to other possible scenarios. Let 𝛾 be the 
receiver's thermal sensor's resolution (sensitivity). Finally, let 
𝑀(𝐴, 𝐵) be the impact function (or rate of temperature affect) 
of the thermal source(s) of 𝐴 with respect to the location of 𝐵's 
thermal sensor within the environment. 
When initiating a transmission, 𝐴 should select 𝐻 and 𝐿 with 
respect to the current room temperature. Furthermore, the 
selection should be made such that 𝐷 will be minimal in respect 
to 𝑂 and 𝛾. From the perspective of the attacker, it is difficult to 
know any prior information about the 𝛾 and 𝑀(𝐴, 𝐵) of the 
target. Therefore, it is a good idea to allot as much flexibility to 
𝛾 as possible with respect to 𝑂. 
Since it is assumed that there are no prior configuration 
settings shared between the two parties, the encoding is 
observation-based. This means that a bit is decoded by 
comparing it to the previously received bit (or signal level), and 
that no prior channel configurations are needed (aside from 𝑇). 
In tables II and III, the 𝐴 encoding rules and 𝐵 decoding rules 
can be found respectively. 
 
TABLE II 
THE TRANSMITTER'S LINE-ENCODING RULES 
 Target Temperature 
Bit to transmit is 0 L  ℃ 
Bit to transmit is 1 H  ℃ 
 
TABLE III 
THE RECEIVER'S LINE DECODING RULES 
Previously Received Bit: 0 1 
Current trend: ℃↑     1 1 
Current trend: ℃ → 0 1 
Current trend: ℃ ↓   0 0 
 
In Table II, it is clear that the transmitter is only concerned 
with whether it should continue to approach the target 
temperature (𝐻,𝐿) or not. In contrast, Table III shows that the 
receiver takes into account whether the transmitter has reached 
a target level by considering the non-changing trend ℃ →.  
Note that 𝐻 and 𝐿 are the target values and not the maximum 
values. For instance, although the air conditioning units within 
the HVAC system are capable of reaching more extreme 
temperatures, in the scenario where 𝐴 is an air conditioning 
unit, 𝐻 could be 26 ℃ and 𝐿 could be 23 ℃. Limiting the 
bounds on the temperatures is important in order to ensure that 
𝑂 is reasonable. Furthermore, in some cases, a very low 𝐿 can 
be problematic in that it could take a long time for 𝐵’s chassis 
to heat up. This would lead to 𝐵 missing several symbols or 
even an entire message. 
In order for this line coding scheme to work, it is imperative 
that some threshold 𝜇 be considered for a trend to be called non-
changing. However, it is advantageous to note that  𝜇 can be 
rather small after noise filtering has been applied to the received 
signal. 
B. Sensor Noise Mitigation 
It is obvious that not all computers have the same 𝛾. For 
instance, the precision of the computer’s internal temperature 
readings are dependent on the API available to the software. 
Usually, these temperature readings are represented as integers 
(and not as floats). Therefore, the recorded samples from the 
quantization process have an inaccuracy due to the incurred 
rounding. Consequently, the detection of low temperature shifts 
within the range of 𝑂 is very difficult to attain. This in turn 
lowers the channel's bit rate since it takes a much longer 𝑇 for 
a change in environment temperature to be detected with 
certainty. 
Fortunately, the quantization problem can be remedied by 
using a moving average filter (MAF) [32]. The MAF is a sliding 
window which averages the last observed discreet samples into 
a single time reference. By using an MAF it is possible to 
achieve an accurate reading of the environmental temperature 
effectively. This is especially the case considering the relatively 
high sampling rate, available on most modern devices.  The 
MAF noise mitigation algorithm for some time span is 
presented in Algorithm 1. The performance of the algorithm is 
available in Section 5.  
 
Algorithm 1: Moving Average Filter for Noise Mitigation 
 
Input: The array of sampled temperatures  "𝑻", 
            the window size parameter to average over "𝒘",  
Output: A smoother representation of 𝑻 in the array "𝑺" 
 
Begin: 
1. FOR 𝒊 = 1 TO 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑻) − 𝒘 
2. 𝒕 ← 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(  𝑻[𝒊 𝑡𝑜 (𝒊 + 𝒘)]   )  
3. 𝑺[𝒊] ← 𝒕 
 
On lines 1-3 of Algorithm 1, an array of sampled values are 
smoothed using a moving average, with a window size of 𝒘. 
From Algorithm 1, it is clear that parameter 𝒘 causes a delay in 
the channel's output. The optimal (smallest possible) parameter 
for 𝒘 is dependent on the channel's bit rate and the sampling 
frequency. Note, it is preferable in general to have a high sample 
rate since more information is captures and changes in the 
signal can be more rapidly detected. 
IV. COVERT THERMAL TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL 
Having proposed the line coding, we will now discuss the 
transmission protocol.  
It is necessary to implement a transmission protocol since a 
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covert channel requires many considerations. For instance, in 
general an attacker will prefer to generate as little noise as 
possible to avoid detection. This is also true in the case where 
assumedly nobody is pre-sent. Therefore, the attacker will 
ensure that the cumulative transmission time will be minimal. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid frequent changes in the 
observable room temperature, the attacker will design the frame 
format accordingly and with care. 
Another physical layer protocol rule the attacker will 
consider is the mitigation of corrupt or falsely sent messages 
from being accepted. For example, if the local personnel 
legitimately leave a door open to an office before going home.  
In this section, we discuss the transmission protocol that 
complements the channel from Section 3. We will also propose 
a possible frame format that an attacker may use in order to 
address the aforementioned challenges. 
A. Frame Format 
The proposed protocol is a frame based messaging 
broadcast. The frame structure can be seen in Fig 3. At the start 
of the frame, a preamble of "10" is sent.  After the preamble, it 
is assumed that the receiver is actively decoding the 
temperature trends according to Table III. At this point a 3 bit 
OP-code is transmitted along with an optional parity bit that 
covers the Op-code and the payload. Instead of a parity bit, a 
forward error correction code (FEC) such as hamming code 
[32] can be used. We found in our experiment that a parity bit 
was sufficient to form a reliable channel. After the parity bit, a 
payload of n bits is transmitted. 
B. Protocol 
From the perspective of the transmitter, the preamble has a 
particular significance. The "10" indicates that the room 
temperature should be raised (for as long as needed) to get to a 
generally readable state, and then reduce the temperature over 
the time T. This is done because the temperature sensors of the 
common PCs we encountered do not read values below a 
certain range.  
Moreover, the preamble is advantageous in its ability to 
decouple H and L from all previous transmissions. For instance, 
let us assume that originally the room temperature starts low 
and one frame is sent successfully. Afterward, the local 
personnel legitimately change the temperature level to a higher 
level. The transmitter and receiver can process the next frame 
with no ties to the previous room temperature measurements.  
Note that in order to mitigate the case of a falsely received 
preamble, we suggest that the receiver both examines/verifies 
the parity bit in the frame and follows a state machine to catch 
any possible "true" preambles received in the middle of a false 
transmission. The proposed protocol is only an example. 
Should a higher reliability be necessary, then forward error 
correction codes (FEC) may be used instead of a parity bit. 
However, it is worthwhile to mention that FECs, such as 
hamming code, may not be suitable. This is because the channel 
may be “sluggish” when changing temperatures near L and 
FECs, like hamming code, require an equal likelihood between 
receiving a ‘1’ or ‘0’ in order to work. 
As for the OP-code field, we believe that only a few 
operational commands are required for the purposes of 
controlling an APT or other similar infiltrations in accordance 
with the uses listed in Table I. Examples of possible Op-codes 
are: "Disable Assets of type X", "Delete all evidence", "Search 
and Destroy file Y", and so on. The frame's payload is self-
explanatory. Depending on the Op-code, it could be anything 
from a file name to an asset type, or even a code obfuscation 
seed. 
The length of the payload (n) depends on the Op-code. For 
instance, a self-destruct command may be 1 bit while a change 
in encryption key may be 128 bits or more. 
In order to minimize the error-rate, an attacker may have the 
air conditioner warm up its components before any 
transmission by heating and then cooling the room. Moreover, 
in order to limit the number of incorrectly read frames, the 
attacker may have designed the protocol to transmit and receive 
frames exactly after a certain set time (e.g., 2:00 a.m.) and not 
just “anytime at night.” In this case the air conditioner may 
warm up its components exactly prior to that time. 
Note that there is a possibility of peer collaboration between 
infected hosts. Although traffic within the isolated network may 
raise alarms of an intrusion detection system (IDS) [33], a 
botnet within an organization can go undetected if the traffic is 
shaped intelligently [34]. This gives an added advantage to the 
scenario depicted in Section 2 because there is a high 
probability that many of the infected hosts have either very 
“noisy” thermal channels with the local air conditioning unit in 
their room, or are simply out of range. A peer to peer 
collaboration network can be used to help pass an attacker’s 
command to the infected host holding the target resource (or 
near the target asset).  
Furthermore, due to the broadcasting nature of the channel, 
it can be assumed that all receivers should get the same 
messages sent by the HVAC system. Hence, it is possible to 
boost the reliability of the message quality if the infected peers 
share their information. For instance, after the parity bit check, 
a majority vote on a received frame can correct the corrupted 
frames.  
An example UML state chart of the communication protocol 
of all the coded into malware from the attack scenario (Section 
2) can be found in Fig. 4. This figure demonstrates the usage of 
all the concepts of the protocol discussed thus far. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section we present experimental results in order to 
concretely show that a covert thermal channel from an air 
conditioner to a nearby computer is possible. The results 
demonstrate that  
a)  changes in room temperature caused from a conventional air 
conditioning unit (within an HVAC system) are detectable 
by a common desktop computer, and  
b) the proposed line-encoding and frame format can be used to 
reliably transmit over an air gap.  
The computer used as the receiver in all experiments was an 
ordinary PC having the specifications in Table IV. 
2 bits 3 bits 1 bit (optional) n bits 
Preamble "10" Op-code Parity bit Payload 
 
Fig. 3.  The covert thermal transmission protocol's frame format. 
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A. Line-Encoding Performance 
There are two aspects which we tested in order to evaluate 
the line encoding’s performance; the noise reduction of the 
MAF on the quantized signal samples, and the impact thermal 
emissions (such as those incurred from casual CPU usage) have 
on thermal channel. 
The PC used in the experiment had a sample resolution (γ) 
of 1℃. This caused a significant amount of noise, in particular 
when trying to detect short signal impulses. Fig. 5 shows how 
the noise mitigation algorithm (MAF) significantly smooths the 
noise in the transmitted signal impulse received by a PC’s CPU 
thermal sensor. For example, a signal impulse (heating on/off) 
is illustrated as a thick grey line in Fig. 5, where a nearby air 
conditioner (3 meters away) heats the room for 90 seconds 
and is then turned off. A step response (depicted as a blue line 
in the same figure) is how the impulse signal sent from the 
transmitter (air conditioner) is received by the receiver (the 
PC’s thermal sensor). The step response is useful since it can be 
used to measure various properties of the channel, such as the 
channel’s noise, propagation delay and bit-rate. 
We note that in our experiments, an open chassis causes a 
slower rate of ascent and a faster rate of descent in contrast to 
having a closed chassis. This result implies that closed chassis 
computers can receive bits at a faster rate than open chassis 
computers (e.g., open server racks). 
Fig. 6 shows the impact of casual usage of the receiving 
computer on the malware’s capability to receive environmental 
thermal signals. Note that the thermal sensor located on the main 
electronic board of the computer (motherboard) is insignificantly 
affected by running processes. This means that thermal signals 
transmitted over the environment will have little interference from 
the heat emitted from the local computer’s components. We use 
this thermal sensor to evaluate the performance of the 
communication protocol. 
B. Protocol Performance 
To test the protocol, we generated a possible frame an 
attacker might broadcast to all receiving computers un-der 
the same HVAC system. This frame consists of a "Change 
Encryption Key for Internal Communications" OP-code and a 
payload with the new 128 bit key (other sized keys are 
possible). In other words, assuming that there is internal 
cooperation between infected hosts, all infected hosts which 
receive this command will update their channel encryption keys 
accordingly. 
We found that the thermal sensor located on the motherboard 
responded faster to changes in the environment’ temperature 
than the CPU’s thermal sensor. This is understandable due to 
the cooling unit (fan and heat sink) attached to the CPU. For 
this reason, we use the motherboard’s sensor for testing the 
protocol. 
First analyzed the step response of the air conditioner going 
from H to L on the motherboard’s thermal sensor where H was 
26 ℃ and L was 23 ℃. From these results (Table V), we decided 
to use a T of 1.5 minutes for the protocol test and set the other 
parameters accordingly (Table VI). With this setting a frame of 
134 bits could be transmitted in about three a half hours 
(overnight) with a bit rate of 40 bits per hour (bph). Afterwards 
we transmitted the 134 bit frame while the receiver sampled the 
sensor (Fig. 7) and then demodulated the bits (Fig. 8). 
It should be noted that the bit rate of the channel will be 
better or worse depending on the scenario (such as the 
receiver’s distance from the transmitter). However, we only 
tested a receiver sample rate of 3.3 Hz. With a much higher 
sample rate and the same quantization γ, it may be possible to 
achieve an even higher bit rate after applying the MAF. 
Regardless, it is conceivable that 40 bph is more than enough 
for the attacker to trigger a task from Table I during the night hours 
(refer to the scenario in Section 2).  
Overall the proposed protocol and line coding were successful 
in our experiments, and have demonstrated the plausibility of 
such a channel. 
Active
Standby
Receive Signal
• Record thermal signals & apply 
noise the noise mitigation algorithm
• Decode Encoding for several possible Ts
• Buffer all decoded binary into buffer "B"
Sleep Timeout
(Wait_Interval)
[Is Daytime] / 
setTimer(Wait_Interval)
Look for Preamble
• In B, seek to next 
possible start bits '10'
Investigate Frame Integrity
• Check parity bit
• Check if the payload content 
fits the indicated OP-code
[Possible Preamble Found]
Collaborate with Peers
• Share with peers the received frame
[Too Few Peers have 
Received this Frame]
Frame Reconstruction
• Peer Majority Vote on Correctness 
(bit-by-bit basis)
Accept Frame
• Send reconstructed frame to all network peers
• Run the frame's command
/ setTimer
(Wait_Interval)START
/ ResetTimer(Contact_
Timeout_Interval)
Terminate
TimeOut(Contact_
Timeout_Interval)
TimeOut(Contact_
Timeout_Interval)
Self Destruct
• Delete all local logs
• Delete Self (uninstall malware)
Update Knowledge of Network
• Seek existing network peers 
within the isolated network
• Manage communication with peers
Event(DayTimeStarted)
Receiver Processing
Networking
[Else]
[Else]
[Frame is Feasible]
Receiver Processing
/ setTimer(Contact_Timeout_Interval)
[Else]
 
Fig. 4.  An example UML state machine for the proposed 
communication protocol. The “[ ]” brackets symbolize a condition, 
“/” indicates an action taken, and dashed lines represent parallel 
states. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  The air conditioning unit’s impact (step response) on a closed chassis 
PC, 3 meters away. Left: the integer samples from the CPU’s thermal sensor 
obtained from the API. Right: the same samples after applying the noise 
mitigation algorithm. 
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VI. FORENSICS & COUNTERMEASURES 
There are various ways that the adversarial attack model 
presented in this paper can be detected and pre-vented. These 
ways can be seen in the attack steps presented in Fig. 2, and are 
enumerated in this section. 
 
A. HVAC Internet Connectivity 
The most direct way to thwart the attack is to increase the 
security around the HVAC system. In particular maintenance 
personnel should be trained to be security aware, by being 
careful about their passwords, and not to leave their 
infrastructure systems unencrypted. Moreover, they should 
know what to keep an eye out for in order to report suspicious 
activity. 
Another option is to place a strong firewall in front of the 
web portal to the system. However, considering the reports of 
vulnerabilities in HVAC systems such as Ni-agara [19], a 
firewall may be of little help, especially in the case of an APT. 
Therefore, the best way to secure an air gapped network is to 
have all overlapping networks air gapped as well, and 
disconnect the HVAC system completely from the internet. 
B. Monitoring the Thermal Environment 
In the case where disconnecting the HVAC from the internet 
is not an option, a less direct way to detect the channel is to 
monitor the thermal environment. This can be done by placing 
thermal sensors in various rooms, and by recording the 
temperature fluctuations. If the channel is used at night, then it 
will be exposed considering there are no personnel around 
(assumedly).  
This strategy is even more affective in rooms where the 
temperature generally stays at the same level. For ex-ample, a 
server room’s temperature is closely regulated 24/7 to stay at a 
low level. Consistent and correlated rises and drops on 
temperature at any point in the day may indicate the presence 
of a covert thermal channel. This requires further research as to 
the protocol or ma-chine learning algorithm that can be used to 
detect these anomalies, while providing a low false alarm rate. 
C. Malware Signatures 
In order for an infected host to detect and receive 
information over a thermal channel, it must consistently sample 
the available thermal sensors. After which, it can be expected 
that some typical noise mitigation processes will be performed 
on the received samples. 
This type of behavior can be detected by performing static 
and dynamic analysis on the code. Such a signature would 
involve a high frequency access to the OS’s thermal sensor 
APIs. 
If code is found having the capability of the de-scribed 
behavior, then the presence of the covert thermal channel is 
exposed. Therefore, it is worthwhile tracking these API calls, 
especially since they do not require privileged permissions 
making (it is feasible for a non-administrator user to install the 
malware on a targeted host). 
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH 
The popular separation of networks by use of an air gap is 
susceptible to attacks from parallel insecure networks. In this 
paper we have shown a new adversarial attack model, where the 
attacker broadcasts commands to infected hosts within an 
isolated network. We have also provided a plausible scenario in 
which an attacker might use this model. Moreover, through 
 
TABLE IV 
PARAMETERS TAKEN FOR TESTING THE PROTOCOL 
Parameter Value 
Case Type Mini ATX 
Power Supply 280W LiteON PS-4281-02, 240W input 
Internal Fans 1 Case Fan, Asia Vital CPU Fan 
Motherboard Lenovo Mahobay, 0C48431 Pro 
CPU Intel i5 3470 @ 3.20Ghz 
RAM Transcend 2x4GB DDR3 800MHz 
Hard-drive Hitachi HDP725050GLA360 ATA Device 500GB 
Operating System Windows 8 Enterprise Build 9200 
 
TABLE V 
THE AIR CONDITIONING UNIT'S IMPACT ON  
THE MOTHERBOARD’S SENSOR AFTER NOISE MITIGATION 
Lowest Recorded Temperature [℃] 22 
Highest Recorded Temperature [℃] 30 
Maximum Temperature Difference [℃] 8 
Distance from Transmitter [𝑚] 3 
Dimensions of the Office Room [𝑚3] 4x4x5 
Linear Rate of Ascent [℃/𝑚𝑖𝑛] 1.23 
Linear Rate of Descent [℃/𝑚𝑖𝑛] -1.24 
 
TABLE VI 
PARAMETERS TAKEN FOR TESTING THE PROTOCOL 
Parameter Value 
𝑪 Small office room 
𝒕 Centralized AC system 
𝒓 Closed chassis desktop computer 
𝑯 26 ℃ 
𝑳 23 ℃ 
𝑫 3 ℃ 
𝜸 1 ℃ 
𝝁 0.01 ℃ 
MAF window 1 minute of samples 
Sample Rate 3.3 Hz 
 
 
Fig. 6.  The impact of the receiving computer’s casual usage on the thermal sensors. 
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discussion and experimentation, we have demonstrated the 
feasibility of signaling a computer from an air conditioner using 
a new thermal line-encoding and complimentary 
communication protocol. We encourage network engineers and 
security experts alike to take this attack into consideration when 
designing an air gapped network.  
Although we have shown how a 40 bit per hour rate channel 
is achievable, we believe that even faster bit rates are possible. 
For instance, we performed our experiment by using the 
motherboard’s heat sensors. There are many more heat sensors 
available (such as the CPU, GPU and Hard-drive) which can be 
used to create a single input multiple output (SIMO) channel 
that maximizes the channel's capacity. Moreover, the device's 
exhaust fan speed can be used as well (after applying a MAF) 
since it is correlated to the environment's temperature.  
Furthermore, we intend to reconstruct the experiment over a 
server farm. Such an attack can be used to cause data leakage 
or another type of sophisticated attack. For instance, it is 
conceivable to thermally transmit messages from one server to 
another in the same server rack as mentioned in [25]. We intend 
to develop a thermodynamic computer model that will allow us 
to run more simulations, efficiently.   
Moreover, an attacker may wish to have an open channel 
during the daily working hours. We intend to expand the 
proposed protocol to take into account the presence of people 
in the room. This is particularly challenging since presence not 
only has an influence on the PCs’ temperature (quality of 
signal), but it also makes the covert channel more susceptible 
to detection (considering the parameter O). Not only would it 
be interesting to see if an attacker could establish a covert 
channel during the day, but determining its plausibility may also 
help detect such attacks in the future. 
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